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THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AN ABSTRACT SYSTEM FOR THE TRANSFER OF 
PROPERTY IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A CAUSAL 
SYSTEM 
 
PJW Schutte* 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Two divergent systems are usually differentiated between when it comes to the way 
in which real rights are transferred from one person to another, namely abstract and 
causal systems. The purpose of this article is to determine the features of each 
system, the respect in which they differ from each other, and the practical 
implications of the distinction. At the centre of the differentiation is the relationship 
between the obligatory agreement (usually referred to as the causa), delivery in the 
case of movables (traditio) or registration in the case of immovable property, and the 
intention of transferring real rights, which is construed as a real agreement in an 
abstract system. Since the real agreement is one of the features which distinguish 
the two systems from each other1 the characteristics of this agreement will be 
highlighted. Furthermore, the causa concept lies at the root of the distinction. 
Therefore, the concept as such and the question whether or not a iusta causa is a 
requirement for the transfer of real rights in an abstract system is necessarily raised. 
For the purposes of this discussion reference will be made throughout to the South 
African and German legal systems as examples of an abstract system, which will be 
compared with the French legal system as being an example of a causal system, 
and the Dutch system, which can be described as a mixed system.2 
 
  
                                            
*
  PJW (Flip) Schutte. BA B Juris LL B LL D. Associate Professor of Law, North-West University 
(Potchefstroom Campus). Email: flip.schutte@nwu.ac.za. 
1 The construction of the real agreement is anchored in an abstract system. 
2 Although the system which is applied in the Netherlands is described as a mixed system, this 
does not prevent the causal aspects found in the system from being proffered as characteristics 
of a causal system. 
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2 Characteristics of a pure causal system 
 
In a pure causal system (such as the system which is applied in France), real rights 
are transferred to the transferee by conclusion of the obligatory agreement.3 Delivery 
is no separate requirement for the transfer of real rights, and it is also no juridical act. 
It is nothing more than a mere physical act by means of which the transferee is 
placed in control of the thing so that he can exercise the powers of the owner. The 
intention at the stage when the thing is delivered (the animus or mental disposition 
which delivery is incidental to) is therefore irrelevant. What is indeed important is the 
intention of the parties at the moment the obligatory agreement comes into being. 
Since the mutual intention to transfer and to receive real rights (the animus 
transferendi et accipiendi dominii) is already contained in the obligatory agreement,4 
it is not construed as an independent real agreement that is detached from the 
obligatory agreement.5 A separate real agreement therefore has no right of existence 
in a causal system. Real rights are simply transferred as a result of consensus 
between the parties (also referred to as transfer by consensus or consensualism).6 
 
A iusta causa traditionis is a requirement for the transfer of real rights in a causal 
system. Literally translated, the concept causa traditionis refers to the reason or the 
legal ground for delivery,7 such as a preceding obligatory agreement (for instance a 
contract of purchase and sale) or other juridical fact which could serve as justification 
for the transfer of real rights (such as an exchange, a will or collatio).8 The reason 
why the transferor delivers the thing to the transferee is thus usually because some 
                                            
3 Consult inter alia ss 711, 1138 and 1583 of the French Code Civil 1804. Drobnig "Transfer of 
Property" 1005; Bell, Boyron and Whittaker Principles of French Law 280-283; Halpérin French 
Civil Code 42-46; Marsh Comparative Contract Law 238-244. 
4 It appears for instance from the fact that the parties closed a deed of sale, an agreement of 
exchange or a settlement which is expressly or by implication aimed at the transfer of real rights. 
5 The obligation is not merely a source of the parties' intention (not simply a means of proof); it is 
the embodiment of the intention itself. Iusta causa and the animus transferendi dominii are in 
other words equated. Consult Cronjé 1984 THRHR 202; Den Dulk Zakelijke Overeenkomst 14. 
6 See Drobnig "Transfer of Property" 1005; Nicholas French Law of Contract 154-155; Marsh 
Comparative Contract Law 238-244; Dondorp and Schrage Levering 3; Hallebeek 2004 
Codicillus 6 et seq. But see fn 16 below for criticism of the use of the term consensualism to 
distinguish between causal and abstract systems. 
7 Causa can also be translated with cause, foundation and legal basis for delivery. 
8 Carey Miller Acquisition 124: " ... the causal approach requires a linking causa or basis - typically, 
an underlying contract - which can be seen as the raison d'être for delivery". Pitlo, Reehuis and 
Heisterkamp Goederenrecht 83; Halpérin French Civil Code 42. 
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or other obligation compels him to do so. The term iusta says that the legal ground 
should also be valid and enforceable. In other words, the obligatory agreement or 
other juristic fact by virtue of which delivery takes place should be valid and 
enforceable. 
 
Should the thing be delivered by virtue of a null and void causa, it is therefore 
obvious that no real right will be transferred because there is no legal ground or 
reason (causa) for the transfer.9 This is so, even though the parties intended to 
transfer the right concerned, because delivery is not an independent requirement 
and the intention at this stage is irrelevant. The intention to transfer is in other words 
not construed as a separate (real) agreement; it forms part of the preceding 
agreement or other juristic fact. A separate real agreement therefore has no right of 
existence in a causal system. The causa (in the sense described above) is all 
important; hence the term causal system. 
 
The requirement of a iusta causa traditionis for the transfer of real rights stems from 
Roman law.10 However, there was no consensus regarding the precise meaning that 
had to be attached to the concept iusta. It can be translated with valid, but also with 
appropriate or acceptable. In other words, uncertainty prevailed with respect to the 
question as to whether the concept iusta causa refers to an objective valid reason for 
transfer, or merely to an appropriate reason for transfer. The origin of the uncertainty 
is two texts from the Digest which apparently were in conflict with each other, namely 
Digest 41 1 36 (Julian) and Digest 12 1 18 pr (Ulpian). The question which came 
under discussion here was, amongst others, if property is transferred if the transferor 
hands money to the transferee as a donation, but he accepts it on the assumption 
                                            
9 The causa can for instance be null and void due to a defect in form, or because it is contrary to 
the public order or the boni mores, or because it is contrary to a statutory provision, or because 
the alienation has taken place through a person who has no legal capacity to act, or because the 
parties have fiduciary transfer in mind (sec 3:84(3) NBW). Pitlo, Reehuis and Heisterkamp 
Goederenrecht 85-87, 92 ff; Bell, Boyron and Whittaker Principles of French Law 302 ff, 426-428, 
440 ff. 
10 Digest 41 1 31 pr. Consult furthermore Gaius Institutiones 2.19-20; Zuluetta Gaius 61; Diósdi 
Ownerskip 140-143; Feenstra Grondslagen 47, 57 62-63; Honsell, Mayer-Maly and Selb 
Römisches Recht 158; Kaser Privatrecht 416-417, 546; Pugsley 1974 THRHR 13; Pugsley 1975 
THRHR 323; Zimmermann Obligations 237-238; Lokin "Overdracht" 11-12, 16; Van Zyl 
Romeinse Privaatreg 144; Snijders and Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht 265-266; Pitlo 
Zakenrecht 192; Asser, Mijnssen and De Haan Zakenrecht 177; Mijnssen and Schut Levering en 
Overdracht 53; Schoordijk Vermogensrecht 263; Wiarda Cessie 138. 
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that it is lent to him.11 Ulpian held the opinion that ownership was not transferred 
because no valid obligatory agreement existed.12 It seems that he insisted on a iusta 
causa as a requirement for the transfer of property. It has been pointed out above 
that a iusta causa in the sense of a valid and enforceable obligatory agreement or 
other juridical fact that obliges the transferor to deliver the thing is a requirement for 
the transfer of real rights in a causal system.13 Should the agreement be null and 
void, there is no legal basis (causa) for delivery; hence no real right will be 
transferred. Ulpian's viewpoint thus serves as justification for a causal system.14 
 
3 Characteristics of an abstract system 
 
Unlike the situation in a causal system, obligatory agreement and delivery are 
distinguished from each other in an abstract system as being two separate juridical 
acts. The obligatory agreement creates only an obligation which obliges the parties 
to perform, but it does not result in the transfer of real rights.15 In order to bring about 
transfer (and for the execution of the obligatory agreement) the transferee also has 
to take control of the thing by means of an act of delivery (traditio), or immovables 
need to be registered. The principle of traditionalism as opposed to the principle of 
consensualism applies.16 
                                            
11 The facts are given here in a rather simplified manner. A detail discussion does not fall within the 
scope of this article, but the following sources may be consulted in this regard: Dondorp en 
Schrage Levering 21-22; Ehrhardt Justa Causa 137; Fuchs Iusta Causa 135; Hazewinkel-
Zuringa Mancipatio 135-140, 164-165; Honsell, Mayer-Maly and Selb Römisches Recht 159; 
Lokin Leerstukken 167-168; Lokin "Overdracht" 168; Molkenteller Dinglichen Vertrag 63-64, 67-
69; Van Oven Romeinsch Privaatrecht 76-79, 227-228; Pflüger "Zwei Digestenstellen" 44; 
Pugsley 1975 THRHR 323; Van Oven Causa en Levering 30-31; Wolf Error 102, 104 ff. 
12 There was no obligation on the transferor to donate the money. The agreement was void 
because the parties were not unanimous regarding the nature of the agreement. 
13 The reason (causa) why the transferor delivers the thing is because he is obliged to do so, owing 
to a preceding obligation to deliver – the legal foundation or basis (causa) for the transfer of real 
rights is the obligation. 
14 Although the Romans did not judge the transfer process in terms of causal and abstract, 
elements of the respective systems were indeed present in Roman law. Consult Eisele 1885 Jhjb 
14-16; Hazewinkel-Zuringa Mancipatio 140, 164-165; Hijmans Zakenrecht 117-118; Honsell, 
Mayer-Maly and Selb Römisches Recht 159; Lokin Leerstukken 168; Lokin "Overdracht" 168; 
Molkenteller Dinglichen Vertrag 63-64; Van Oven Romeinsch Privaatrecht 78-79. 
15 Unlike in the English and French legal systems, the conclusion of a contract does not result in 
the transfer of real rights ipso facto. Delivery is also not simply a factual act; it is a separate 
juridical act. 
16 See Dondorp and Schrage Levering 3; Hallebeek 2004 Codicillus 6 et seq. Although the 
dichotomy between consensualism and traditionalism is useful to distinguish between those 
systems where transfer takes place by virtue of mere consensus between the parties (causal 
systems) and those systems where mere consensus is not enough because there should also be 
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However, in itself delivery will not suffice to bring about the transfer of real rights. 
The transferor has to deliver the thing with the intention of transferring real rights and 
the transferee has to take control of the thing with the intention of obtaining real 
rights. Although the intention forms part of the act of delivery, it is nevertheless a 
separate requirement for the transfer of real rights. In an abstract system the mutual 
intention of transferring and receiving real rights is considered a real agreement.17 
This agreement is of crucial importance to an abstract system because, along with 
delivery, it determines whether or not real rights are transferred to the transferee, 
and not the obligatory agreement.18 The concept abstract system is derived precisely 
from the fact that the real agreement is an independent agreement which is 
separated from the preceding obligatory agreement. As an abstract juridical act, the 
real agreement displays two characteristics in particular: 
 
3.1 The content of the agreement 
 
Unlike the situation in a causal system, where the mutual intention to transfer and to 
receive real rights is implied in the obligatory agreement, such an intention is 
abstracted19 from the preceding obligation in an abstract system and attached to the 
act of delivery.20 What is more, the intention of the parties is construed as an 
independent real agreement. As the agreement's content consists merely of the 
mutual intention to transfer and to receive real rights, which intention is abstracted 
from the causa, reference is made to this characteristic of the real agreement as the 
                                                                                                                                       
delivery (traditio), it should be kept in mind that the term consensualism is insufficient to 
distinguish between causal and abstract systems. Also in an abstract system there should be 
consensus between the parties (real agreement) in order for transfer to take place. 
17 In an abstract system there is differentiation not only between obligatory agreement and delivery 
as two independent juristic acts, but also between obligatory agreement and real agreement, a 
differentiation unknown to a causal system. 
18 The real agreement is characteristic of an abstract system, which distinguishes it from a causal 
system. In a causal system the real agreement does not make any sense. See Drobnig "Transfer 
of Property" 1014; Cronjé 1984 THRHR 203-204; Krause 1939 AcP 312, 319.  
19 The concept abstract is used in imitation of the German terminology, where the word Abstraktion 
is used in the sense of separation, distinction or isolation. 
20 In an abstract system the parties' primary intention, at the moment the obligatory agreement is 
entered into, is only to bring about an obligation, and not to transfer real rights. The intention to 
transfer real rights in future (which by implication can be read into the obligatory agreement) is 
also not sufficient to bring about transfer. See Carey Miller Acquisition 125. 
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contential abstraction. However, the agreement in itself does not suffice to bring 
about the transfer of real rights; the thing also needs to be delivered. 
 
3.2 An independent agreement with its own requirements 
 
Apart from its contents, the real agreement also needs to be "externally" abstracted 
or distinguished from the obligatory agreement. This entails that the real agreement 
is an independent agreement which needs to comply with its own requirements. The 
question as to whether the agreement is valid or not therefore also needs to be 
answered independent of the validity of the obligatory agreement or other juridical 
fact which obliges the transferor to deliver. Should delivery take place on account of 
a void obligatory agreement or other juridical fact, the specific real right will be 
transferred to the transferee notwithstanding its being null and void, on condition that 
a valid real agreement exists. The effect of this is that a valid obligatory agreement is 
not a requirement for the transfer of real rights in an abstract system. Rather, the fact 
is acknowledged that the parties can have the intention of transferring real rights, 
even if the obligatory agreement is null and void and even if they are aware of it.21 
Whether the parties in the case of a void obligatory agreement nevertheless had the 
intention of transferring real rights (whether or not there is a real agreement), is a 
factual question which needs to be answered in the light of the circumstances of 
each case.22 
 
From the discussion above it is clear that the characteristic of the external 
abstraction is directly related to the question as to whether or not a valid obligatory 
                                            
21 Consult Baur and Stürner Sachenrecht 47; Cronjé 1978 THRHR 242-243; Van der Merwe 
Sakereg 17, 306; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property 74-76; Carey Miller 
Acquisition 121, 124; Sonnekus Vonnisbundel 392; Laurens Saaklike Regte 285; Van der Walt 
and Pienaar Property 126; Delport and Olivier Vonnisbundel 275; Kriel v Terblanche 2002 6 SA 
132 (NK). 
22 The fact that the obligatory agreement or other juridical fact is null and void does not mean to say 
that the real agreement is also null and void. However, it is indeed possible that the same defect 
which brings about nullity of the obligatory agreement can also lead to the nullity of the real 
agreement. Whether the obligatory agreement or the real agreement, or both, are affected by the 
defect is, however, a factual question the answer to which depends on circumstances. However, 
it would be incorrect to say that the nullity of the obligatory agreement also leads to the nullity of 
the real agreement. The validity of the real agreement should be judged separately. Consult 
Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property 79-80 and Kriel v Terblanche 2002 6 SA 132 
(NK) 147E for guidelines in this respect. 
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agreement is a requirement for the transfer of real rights. It has also been indicated 
that this question was already in dispute in Roman law. While Ulpian insisted on a 
valid and enforceable causa, Julian in turn held the opinion that property was 
transferred even if a valid obligatory agreement did not exist and even if the 
transferor therefore was not obliged to transfer the money. It thus seems that he did 
not insist on a iusta causa in the sense of a valid obligatory agreement. To him, the 
decisive question was whether or not the parties had the intention to transfer 
property. It should be clear that Julian's stance in this respect could be the 
foundation on which an abstract system (in present-day terms) could be built. Should 
the transferor deliver a thing owing to a void agreement, real rights will be transferred 
to the transferee, notwithstanding the fact that he was not obliged to deliver.23 In 
those cases where delivery takes place due to a null and void agreement, the reason 
or causa for delivery is not to be found in the fact that he is obliged to deliver, but 
because he intends to deliver or he mistakenly thinks that he is obliged to deliver. 
Usually such a faulty assumption (or supposed legal ground which is non-existent) is 
referred to as a putative causa.24 Whilst the concept iusta causa (the reason for 
delivery) in a causal system refers to a valid obligation or other juridical fact which 
obliges the transferor to deliver, in an abstract system it includes an agreement that 
is null and void or another legal ground which is non-existent, but which the parties 
mistakenly thought existed. 
 
4 Practical implications of the differentiation between the two systems 
 
Theoretical doctrines, however, are never ends in themselves, but important only in 
so far as they analyse the working of the law in practice and ensure the cohesion 
and consistency of the different rules of a legal system. Therefore, the crux of the 
                                            
23 The transferor will for instance not be obliged to deliver if the deed of sale is null and void, or if 
the will on account of which the delivery has taken place has been revoked. 
24 The parties for instance are under the impression that they have closed an agreement, but later it 
emerges that no agreement has been established because it is null and void and that nothing 
was owed. There will be a putative causa in the following cases too: if the executer transfers 
erroneously on the basis of the rules of the law of intestate succession, whilst a valid will exists; if 
he transfers by virtue of a will that has been revoked whilst he was not aware of it; if he transfers 
on the basis of customary law (the law of succession relating to Black persons), which he 
incorrectly thinks is applicable to the case involved, whilst it is not. 
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matter is: what difference does it make whether one follows the causa or the abstract 
theory?25 
 
When judging the pros and cons of each of the systems, the legal position of the 
respective parties, namely the transferor, the transferee and third parties, as it 
appears in each system, necessarily needs to be taken into consideration. This also 
entails that the interests of the respective parties must be balanced. 
 
In a causal system the transferor undoubtedly finds himself in a favourable position 
vis-à-vis the transferee, since he retains his real right if the thing is delivered on 
account of a void causa.26 He can therefore reclaim the thing with the rei vindicatio 
from the transferee or any third party to whom the thing has been transferred (even if 
the third party is bona fide), because the transferor is still the holder of the right. 
Since the transferee has no right to dispose of the thing, he can also not transfer the 
thing to someone else. Should the transferee be declared insolvent whilst the thing is 
still under his control, it does not fall in his insolvent estate.27 
 
Should the contract not be void, but voidable28 and it becomes void after the thing 
has already been delivered, or after registration has taken place, voidance has real 
effect with retroactive operation up until the date of conclusion of the contract. This 
means that delivery had taken place by reason of a void causa, that transfer is null 
and void with retroactive effect and that the thing by operation of law (ex lege) 
returns to the transferor. The transferor is regarded to have always been the holder 
of the right and he is therefore not prejudiced by the insolvency of the transferee. 
Voidance further also has an absolute effect. This means that the transferor is also 
                                            
25 Silberberg Property 148. 
26 It has been indicated above that a iusta causa is a requirement for the transfer of real rights. 
Should the thing be delivered by virtue of a void agreement, no real rights are transferred. 
Nicholas French Law of Contract 79; Youngs English, French and German Law 555-557. 
27 Drobnig "Transfer of Property" 1007-1008; Nicholas French Law of Contract 80, 154-155; Bell, 
Boyron and Whittaker Principles of French Law 448ff; Marsh Comparative Contract Law 253-257 
(but see 261-263); Snijders and Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht 272; Asser, Mijnssen and De 
Haan Zakenrecht 178-179; Pitlo Zakenrecht 209; Pitlo, Reehuis and Heisterkamp Goederenrecht 
85-86; Konings Openbare Registers 141. 
28 In the Netherlands the title in the following circumstances will be voidable: in the case of error 
(sec 6:228, 6:230 NBW), compulsion, fraud (sec 3:44 NBW), incapacity to act (sec 3:32 NBW), 
mental illness (sec 3:34 NBW), abuse of circumstances (sec 3:44 NBW) and prejudice to 
creditors (sec 3:45 NBW). 
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considered to be the holder of the right as far as third parties are concerned and that 
he can claim the thing with the rei vindicatio from any person who has control over 
it.29 
 
Protagonists of the causal system justify the system with the following arguments: it 
protects real rights as a legal institution; the owner should lose his real rights only if 
an agreed foundation exists for such a loss (hence transfer must rest on a valid 
obligatory agreement); the legal norms and provisions of a statute that prohibits 
agreements based on policy considerations must be adhered to. Should an 
agreement be null and void because it is prohibited by law, such a null and void 
agreement should also have no legal consequences. No fault can be found with this 
argument, especially not if the parties are aware of the defect, or if only the 
transferee was aware of it. Had the transferor been responsible for the defect, or if 
he had delivered the thing while being aware of the defect, it is, however, debatable 
in consideration of fairness whether or not he deserves protection. 
 
In an abstract system the transferor is in an unfavourable position vis-à-vis the 
transferee and third parties since a real right is transferred to the transferee 
notwithstanding the nullity of the obligatory agreement. In his turn, the transferee 
may transfer the same real right to a third party, who will become the holder of the 
right.30 Furthermore, should the transferee after delivery be declared insolvent, the 
fact that a real right has been transferred means that the thing falls in his insolvent 
estate and that the transferor is only a concurrent creditor. Should the first transferor 
establish, after transfer, that the contract of sale (for instance) is void, he can 
therefore not reclaim the thing with the rei vindicatio from the transferee or third party 
to whom he has transferred it in the meantime, because he is no longer the holder of 
the right. However, this does not mean to say that his hands are tied and that the 
transferor is worse off when his position is compared with that of the transferee. 
                                            
29 See sec 3:53(1) NBW; Pitlo, Reehuis and Heisterkamp Goederenrecht 86-87; Snijders and 
Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht 272, 275; Dondorp and Schrage Levering 7-8. Bell, Boyron and 
Whittaker Principles of French Law 451; Nicholas French Law of Contract 76-81; Youngs 
English, French and German Law 557. 
30 Provided there was a valid real agreement and the parties had the intention of transferring the 
real right. Should that not have been their intention, the right would not be transferred and the 
transferor would have a real action. 
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Because the thing has been transferred sine causa, he has the condictio indebiti at 
his disposal, by means of which he can reclaim the thing or the value thereof from 
the transferee.31 In other words, the only difference between the two systems, when 
the position of the transferor is compared with that of the transferee, is that the 
remedies available to the transferor differ.32 However, the transferor has no claim 
based on the condictio indebiti against bona fide third parties that have received the 
thing from the transferee, unless the thing has been transferred to the third party 
without value.33  
 
Whilst the causal system gives preference to the interests of the transferor vis-à-vis 
the transferee, it gives insufficient protection to third parties against the 
disadvantageous consequences of delivery owing to a void or voidable obligation. 
The system can be criticised because it can be unfair towards third parties that 
presume that the person who has physical control over the thing, or in whose name 
land has been registered, is also the owner (especially if the third party was not 
aware or could not have been aware of the fact that someone else is the owner of 
the thing – if he is bona fide). In the Netherlands the legal position of bona fide third 
parties has improved considerably, since the Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1992 now 
grants better protection to them than was the case under the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 
1838. The third party transferee will become the owner even if he obtained the thing 
from a person who is not entitled to dispose of the thing concerned, on condition that 
                                            
31 Provided the transferee is enriched to the detriment of the transferor. Defects in the underlying 
agreement are, in other words, not completely irrelevant. The condictio is granted because the 
person who transferred without a reason should be protected in appropriate circumstances. 
Transfer is never a goal in itself. Should the thing be delivered owing to an illegal contract, the 
par delictum rule will, however, prevent him from acting with the condictio. See Badenhorst, 
Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property 77-78; Dondorp and Schrage Levering 7-8; Van Oven 
Romeinsch Privaatrecht 75; Lokin Leerstukken 159. 
32 However, it should be granted that the transferor can be worse off when he institutes a condictio, 
as opposed to the rei vindicatio. The condictio is for instance a personal action which forgoes the 
characteristics of pursuance and preference. Furthermore, should the transferor have erred and 
was mistakenly under the impression that he was obliged to perform, he would also succeed with 
the condictio only if it was an excusable error. See De Vos 1976 TSAR 79. 
33 Consult Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property 79; De Vos 1976 TSAR 79; De Vos 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 23, 30, 66-67, 156 and 187; Van der Merwe Sakereg 17, 306; Van 
der Walt and Pienaar Property 126-127, 159; Sonnekus Vonnisbundel 466; Kriel v Terblanche 
2002 6 SA 132 (NK); Asser and Beekhuis Zakenrecht 176; Konings Openbare Registers 141; 
Pitlo Zakenrecht 206; Pitlo, Reehuis and Heisterkamp Goederenrecht 87-88; Snijders and Rank-
Berenschot Goederenrecht 269-271. 
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the requirements mentioned in the act are complied with.34 The respective provisions 
are exceptions to the requirement that the transferor must be entitled to dispose of 
the thing. It has also resulted in the nemo plus iuris rule being eased considerably for 
the sake of the protection of bona fide third parties.35 
 
As against the causal system, in an abstract system third parties find themselves in a 
favourable position – real rights are transferred to the transferee, even if the thing is 
delivered by virtue of a void obligatory agreement. Should the transferee be 
sequestrated after delivery, the thing falls into his insolvent estate. The transferor 
then has only a concurrent claim, which is scant consolation.36 The criticism against 
the system is that the insolvent's creditors share in the yields of a thing which, in 
terms of a void juristic act, came into his hands. No reason exists why they have to 
be favoured in such circumstances to the detriment of the transferor, especially not if 
the transferee was aware of the defect or was responsible for it. Should the 
transferor have been aware of the defect in the legal basis for delivery and not the 
transferee, it can again be argued that it is just fair for real rights to pass, especially if 
it transpires that, notwithstanding his knowledge of the defect, he still intended to 
transfer the real right concerned. 
 
Finally it is pointed out that third parties also enjoy protection by virtue of the doctrine 
of estoppel. In appropriate circumstances the transferor can in terms of this doctrine 
be prohibited from claiming his thing from the third party with the rei vindicatio. 
Should the transferor neglect to claim the thing immediately from the transferee to 
whom he transferred, he makes a misrepresentation to the third party that the 
transferee has obtained a legal title which is transferrable. He can be held to this 
misrepresentation if the requirements for estoppel are met.37 
                                            
34 Also see s 1141 Code Civil 1804; Bell, Boyron and Whittaker Principles of French Law 451; 
Drobnig "Transfer of Property" 1007. S 2279 also protects the good faith transferee in that it 
provides that, in case of movable property, possession is equivalent to title. 
35 See eg ss 3:86, 3:88, 3:24, 3:26 and 3:36 NBW. The provisions are not discussed in more detail, 
but consult Asser, Mijnssen and De Haan Zakenrecht 184; Pitlo, Reehuis and Heisterkamp 
Goederenrecht 88-89; Mijnssen and Schut Levering en Overdracht 142-143. 
36 Should a transferor for instance have transferred a piece of land to an insolvent owing to a void 
agreement, the prejudice is obvious. 
37 See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property 79; Van der Merwe Sakereg 307; Van der 
Walt and Pienaar Property 149. In the Netherlands (a causal system) third parties are protected 
against prejudice caused by misrepresentation by the owner-transferor in terms of sec 3:36 
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Protagonists of the abstract system are nevertheless prepared to accept that 
creditors of the transferee and third parties are unduly favoured by the system, since 
it grants bona fide third parties considerable protection, even when it is to the 
detriment of the transferor.38 The third party to whom the transferee has transferred 
the thing in the meantime becomes the owner, notwithstanding the fact that his 
predecessor had obtained the thing by reason of a void agreement. The transferor 
will therefore not be able to claim from the third party with the rei vindicatio. This 
favourable position of third parties is, amongst others, justified with an appeal to the 
publicity principle, legal certainty and considerations of equity. Third parties that rely, 
as they are entitled to, on the apparent legal certainty of the transferor's title and 
regard him as the holder of the right,39 should not be disappointed regarding their 
trust. In this respect the abstract system promotes legal certainty, since it prevents 
that doubt regarding the validity of the obligatory agreement or other juridical fact 
which obliges the transferor to deliver from also impacting on the validity of the act of 
delivery. Outsiders can accept that the person who is apparently the holder of the 
right is indeed entitled to dispose of a thing.40 Should a third party not have known, 
or was not supposed to know, that the transfer to his predecessor had taken place in 
terms of a void agreement, it would be unfair to sacrifice his rights in favour of the 
transferor. The reasoning is that a defective agreement as the legal basis for delivery 
falls rather within the terrain of responsibility of the transferor than within that of the 
third party, especially if he was aware of the defect. On considerations of fairness the 
transferor should bear the risk of a defective causa. Third parties should not be 
prejudiced by it.41  
 
                                                                                                                                       
NBW. Consult Pitlo, Reehuis and Heisterkamp Goederenrecht 81; Snijders and Rank-
Berenschot Goederenrecht 335; Asser, Mijnssen and De Haan Zakenrecht 175. 
38 Drobnig "Transfer of Property" 1017-1018. 
39 Because he is, for instance, indicated in the deeds register as the true owner, or because he is 
physically in control of the thing. 
40 Although the system occasionally can be unfair towards the transferor, his interests are sacrificed 
for the sake of legal certainty and commercial interaction. 
41 Van der Merwe Sakereg 17-18, 306-307; Van der Merwe "Sakereg" para 299; Carey Miller 
Acquisition 124; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property 79. The abstract principle is 
criticised in German law. The criticism is understandable there, because in German law bona fide 
acquisition of property is possible and the reasoning is exactly that third parties are sufficiently 
protected in this manner. However, the creditors of third parties cannot be protected by bona fide 
acquisition of property. See Cronjé 1978 THRHR 243. 
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The abstract approach is criticised because, in the opinion of the critics, it is 
outrageous to attach any legal consequences to a transfer which, for instance, arose 
from a legally prohibited ground (causa).42 The reasoning is that it is irrational to 
acknowledge the consequence as valid if the cause is prohibited. As far as they are 
concerned, no legal consequences should arise from a void obligatory agreement, 
and the act of execution should also be null and void, because it is subjected to the 
same prohibitions. The critics of the system furthermore point out that specific policy 
considerations usually are fundamental to a legal rule by means of which a specific 
juridical act is prohibited on account of its being null and void. In an abstract system 
the policy considerations and the accompanying goal pursued with such a legal norm 
can be nullified. It is then of no use.43 
 
The necessity of choosing between the causal and the abstract systems arises only 
in those exceptional cases where the obligation or other legal ground is null and 
void, where there is legally no foundation by virtue of which delivery takes place and 
both parties nevertheless have the intention to transfer real rights. Should A for 
instance think he is selling the thing involved to B, but B is of the opinion that he is 
receiving a gift, no valid obligatory agreement comes into being due to the lack of 
consensus. However, both parties intended to transfer property to B through 
delivery.44 In such a situation there is one of two choices: (1) property is indeed 
transferred (abstract) or (2) property is not transferred (causal). 
 
5 Is a causa a requirement at all in an abstract system? 
 
In Roman law and even long after, the point of view occurred that although a valid 
obligation or other legal ground (iusta causa) might not have been a requirement for 
the transfer of real rights, a reason (causa) for transfer had to exist. This view still 
                                            
42 As already indicated, real rights can be transferred in an abstract system, even though the 
obligatory legal ground is null and void, for example because the prescribed requirements 
regarding form have not been met. 
43 Consult Asser and Beekhuis Zakenrecht 179-180; Pitlo Zakenrecht 204, 209-210. The last-
mentioned nevertheless grants that this viewpoint is also subjective and that there is still room for 
an opposite viewpoint. He points out that a marriage concluded with a view simply to obtaining 
another nationality is nevertheless valid. 
44 However, each party has another reason (or legal ground) which forms the basis for his intention 
to transfer the property. Consult Carey Miller Acquisition 124. 
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occurs today. It is justified with the argument that no one transfers something without 
a reason and that the transfer of property must always rest on one ground or 
another, which legally serves as justification for the transfer of real rights – real rights 
cannot be transferred unless a legal basis exists which is suitable for bringing about 
the transfer. 
 
However, this viewpoint cannot be supported. Should the causa, in the sense of an 
obligatory agreement or other legal ground which obliges a party to deliver, not have 
to be valid, it is senseless to insist at all on a causa (obligation) as a requirement for 
transfer of real rights. If the viewpoint is followed through to its logical consequences, 
it amounts to a void obligation or other legal basis which is non-existent, but which 
the parties mistakenly think exists (a putative causa), being a requirement for the 
transfer of real rights.45 It is proposed that if the causa, in the sense of some or other 
obligation or other legal ground does not have to be valid, it is unnecessary to insist 
at all on a causa as a requirement for the transfer of real rights in an abstract 
system. Only a valid juridical act can really be legally obligatory. It is suggested that 
a causa as a requirement for the transfer of real rights should be given up in an 
abstract system. Alternatively another meaning should be attached to the concept.46 
 
In Roman law an obligatory agreement was a requirement for the transfer of real 
rights.47 Therefore, the definition of the causa concept with reference to such an 
agreement was indeed meaningful. However, in an abstract system it serves no 
purpose to describe the causa with reference to the obligatory agreement, since it is 
no substantive law requirement for the transfer of real rights.48 What is indeed 
                                            
45 This would be like saying that real rights will be transferred only if a void obligation exists. 
46 See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property 76: "However, if this causa does not have 
to be valid, it can hardly be a legal requirement for the effectiveness of transfer ..." Should a 
putative causa be a requirement for the transfer of real rights, it is no longer an abstract system. 
Scholtens 1957 SALJ 281-283 holds the opinion that it is an intermediate system (in other words, 
something in between a causal and an abstract system), whilst De Vos 1976 TSAR 84 calls it a 
diluted causal system. See also Silberberg Property 138; Van der Merwe Sakereg 309-310. 
47 Refer to the sources mentioned in fn 10 above. In addition consult: Kaser Privatrecht 249; 
Zimmermann Obligations 680; Van Oven Causa en Levering 39; Hazewinkel-Zuringa Mancipatio 
202-213. 
48 In the vast majority of cases delivery will indeed take place owing to a legal obligation which will 
also be the reason or legal ground (causa) for delivery. But if the agreement is null and void and 
property is nevertheless transferred, it is of no use to define the causa with reference to a valid 
causa. A definition is meant to provide for all possibilities, as far as possible. 
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required is that both parties should have the intention to transfer and to receive real 
rights. The causa therefore refers to the mutual intention to transfer and receive real 
rights, which is nothing less than the real agreement.49 The reason why the 
transferor delivers the thing not important is in any case when the requirements for 
the transfer of real rights are under discussion. What is indeed important, and this is 
what the law is interested in, is the reason for the transfer. Should delivery take place 
by virtue of an obligatory agreement that is null and void, the reason or causa for the 
transferor to deliver the thing is in any case not because he is obliged to do so 
through an obligation but because he intends to transfer a real right (or because he 
mistakenly thinks he is obliged to do so).50 
 
Should this viewpoint be correct (and it is suggested that it is indeed so), the causa 
concept would be superfluous in an abstract system, because it hwould have been 
incorporated into the real agreement. It would be unnecessary to insist on a causa 
(which is the intention to transfer real rights) as a requirement for the transfer of real 
rights and, besides, to also require a real agreement (i.e. the intention to transfer and 
to receive real rights). 
 
In Roman law the causa for delivery (preceding obligation) and the causa for the 
transfer of property (the intention to transfer real rights) were not distinguished from 
each other.51 Not one single text exists in the Corpus Iuris Civilis that expressly 
states the intention to transfer as a requirement for the transfer of real rights (it 
simply played a subordinate role), and also no text exists that defines the causa with 
reference to the transferor's intention. Julianus' point of view, which is described 
above, does present links for the fact that the reason or causa for delivery can be 
found in the intention to transfer real rights, but no consensus exists regarding the 
                                            
49 But see Scholtens 1957 SALJ 280 who defines "the circumstances underlying the intention to 
transfer ownership by traditio" as the causa. 
50 The reason (causa) for delivery and the reason (causa) for the transfer of property (which do not 
necessarily correspond in an abstract system) need to be differentiated from each other. In a 
causal system, the reason for delivery will necessarily also be the reason for transfer, because 
delivery is not an independent act. 
51 Dondorp en Schrage Levering 17; Van Oven Romeinsch Privaatrecht 72-74; Hazewinkel-Zuringa 
Mancipatio 216-217; Kaser Privatrecht 417; Jahr 1963 ZSS 141, 169, 174; Honsell, Mayer-Maly 
and Selb Römisches Recht 157-158; Molkenteller Dinglichen Vertrag 64-66; Delport Lewering en 
Registrasie 108. 
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precise interpretation that should be attached to the text.52 During the Middle Ages it 
was indeed realised that two different causae need to be distinguished from each 
other, namely (i) the causa remota (preceding the obligation or supposed obligation), 
which is not always the actual reason for the transfer of real rights, and (ii) the actual 
or immediate reason for transfer (causa immediata or efficiens), which can be found 
in the intention of the transferor.53 
 
Savigny54 rejected the viewpoint that a preceding obligation (causa remota) is a 
requirement for transfer of real rights. He emphatically declared that the actual 
reason why the transferor delivers in the case of a void agreement is not because he 
is obliged by reason of an obligation, but because he has the intention of transferring 
real rights. Therefore, the intention to transfer real rights (causa immediata) is 
defined as the causa. However, he later changed his mind and then took the 
viewpoint that the causa is the circumstances from which the intention to transfer 
real rights can be deduced (for instance the preceding valid or void obligation). 
Savigny did not proffer reasons for the change in his viewpoint, but there is a strong 
probability that he did it because in a legal-historical sense it is incorrect to define the 
causa as the intention. The concept has always referred to a preceding obligation. 
His definition, therefore, did not correspond with the sources, and he was aware of 
the fact that his theory had to correspond with classical Roman law. Although he 
attempted to keep as close as possible to the historic meaning of the concept with 
his new definition (causa is the circumstances from which the intention can be 
determined, for instance the preceding obligation), the irony is that it is also incorrect 
in a legal historical and linguistic sense. Translated literally, causa means the 
foundation or reason for delivery and not the circumstances from which the intention 
can be deduced. In any case, this viewpoint confuses factum probandum with factum 
probans. 
 
                                            
52 No clarity exists regarding what Julianus' viewpoint actually was, and no definite conclusions can 
be drawn from it. Consult the sources referred to in fn 11 above. 
53 Consult inter alia Fulgosius ad Digesta 12.1.18 (in Fuchs Iusta Causa 52); Baldus ad Digesta 
4.3.7 pr; Donellus Iure Civili 4.16a nd Donellus Opera 4.16. 
54 Consult Savigny's lectures of 1815-1816 in Felgentraeger Savignys Einfluß 32-33, 33-34, the 
lectures of 1820-1821 in Felgentraeger Savignys Einfluß 35-36 and Savigny Obligationenrecht 
256. 
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The fact that a preceding obligatory agreement or other juridical fact which obliges 
delivery in an abstract system is not a requirement for the transfer of real rights does 
not mean to say that it is entirely irrelevant. The importance of the obligatory 
agreement in an abstract system lies in the fact that it can serve as proof that the 
parties, at the moment when the thing was transferred, had the intention of 
transferring real rights. Although an obligatory agreement is not a substantive law 
requirement for the transfer of real rights (it is not a factum probandum), it is a 
means of proof from which the parties' intention to transfer real rights can be 
determined (it is a factum probans).55 From the agreement it can be deduced 
whether the intention was directed at the transfer of real rights (as with purchase and 
exchange), or not (as with hire and pledge).56 The form in which the agreement is 
moulded is, however, not necessarily an indication of their intention. Time and again, 
in the light of the facts of each case, it should be determined what the parties' actual 
intention was.57 Even a void obligatory agreement can serve as proof of the parties' 
intention. In Krapohl v Oranje Koöperasie Bpk58 the court for instance deduced from 
the void obligatory agreement that the parties indeed intended to transfer real 
rights.59 The intention can also be deduced from circumstances other than the 
preceding agreement, and there can be more direct evidence of the parties' intention 
to transfer and receive real rights. Should such evidence indeed be available, it is 
                                            
55 Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Brothers and Hudson 1941 AD 369, 398-399 
and 411; Krapohl v Oranje Koöperasie 1990 3 SA 848 (A) 864; Concor Construction v 
Santambank 1993 3 SA 930 (A) 933 F-G; Bank Windhoek v Rajie 1994 1 SA 115 (A) 141 D-E, 
144 I; Carey Miller Acquisition 123, 132-134; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property 
76; Van der Merwe Sakereg 303; Cronjé 1978 THRHR 229-230, 240-241; Hazewinkel-Zuringa 
Mancipatio 130-131; Savigny Obligationenrecht 258, 259. In this respect the function of the 
obligatory agreement differs from that in Roman law, where it was indeed a substantive law 
requirement. Refer to the sources mentioned in fn 10 and 49 above. 
56 If the parties actually meant pledge, they could not have had transfer of property in mind. See 
Bank Windhoek v Rajie 1994 1 SA 115 (A) 141 D-E, 144 I. 
57 Consult Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers and Hudson 1941 AD 369; 
Bank Windhoek v Rajie 1994 1 SA 115 (A) 142 D-G, 144 I - 145 B. Concor Construction v 
Santambank 1993 3 SA 930 (A) 939 B-D; Quenty's Motors v Standard Credit Corporation 1994 3 
SA 188 (A). 
58 Krapohl v Oranje Koöperasie 1990 3 SA 848 (A) 864. See also Van der Merwe Sakereg 306. 
59 A void agreement can, however, also justify the conclusion that the parties did not intend to 
transfer property. Concor Construction v Santambank 1993 3 SA 930 (A) 933 F-G: "Equally, the 
absence of such an agreement may, depending upon the circumstances, be evidence of the 
absence of any such intention". The nature of the deduction depends on circumstances. See also 
Van der Merwe Sakereg 313; Van der Walt and Pienaar Property 126. 
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unnecessary to rely on the underlying legal foundation for drawing conclusions in this 
regard.60 
 
6 The Netherlands as an example of a mixed system 
 
The characteristics of the abstract and causal systems in the pure form of each were 
discussed above. Different variations also occur, however, between a pure causal 
system (which insists on a valid preceding obligatory agreement as the foundation 
for transfer) and a pure abstract system (where the intention of the parties will 
always be decisive), since a specific legal system may in practice display elements 
of both systems. The application of abstract and causal can fluctuate, depending on 
the circumstances and the problem situation being addressed.61 For the purposes of 
this investigation the Netherlands will be taken as an example of such a mixed 
system and the characteristics thereof will be compared with those of the French 
system (as an example of a pure causal system) on the one hand and the South 
African and German systems on the other (as examples of abstract systems).62 This 
comparison indicates that the system of the Netherlands displays the characteristics 
of an abstract system, but that it also contains features of a causal system. 
 
6.1 Characteristics of an abstract system 
 
The rule of Roman law (which is also applied in Roman-Dutch law), namely that real 
rights cannot be transferred simply by agreement but that the thing must also be 
delivered, is still applied these days in the Netherlands. As in South Africa and 
Germany, distinction is also drawn between a preceding obligation or other juridical 
fact which obliges the transferor to deliver, on the one hand (causa or title), and 
delivery (traditio) on the other, as being two separate juridical acts. The obligatory 
                                            
60 See Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers and Hudson 1941 AD 369, 411. 
61 Systems cannot be divided into watertight compartments. See Carey Miller Acquisition 126; 
Scholtens 1957 SALJ 281; Silberberg and Schoeman Property 77. 
62 The question as to whether a causal or abstract system is applied in the Netherlands was 
controversial for many years. The Hoge Raad brought an end to the controversy by deciding that 
the causal doctrine was applicable. Consult, amongst others, HR 5 May 1950 NJ 1951 1; HR 10 
December 1952 NJ 1953 550 (immovables); HR 9 February 1939 NJ 1939 865 (session); HR 12 
June 1970 NJ 1970 203. Sec 3:84 (1) NBW now requires a legally valid title, which makes it clear 
that a causal system is applicable. Also Pitlo, Reehuis and Heisterkamp Goederenrecht 111-112. 
As will become evident from the discussion hereafter, it is, however, not a pure causal system. 
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agreement does not yet transfer real rights; it only creates rights and obligations. The 
act of delivery (which is a separate requirement for the transfer of real rights) in turn 
aims at complying with the obligation which arises from the agreement and from 
ending the obligation. The Dutch system therefore differs from a causal system as it 
is applied in France in this respect, that real rights are not transferred by the 
conclusion of the obligatory agreement; a separate act of delivery also has to take 
place.63 
 
In an abstract system, acknowledgement of delivery (traditio) as a separate juridical 
act in the process of transfer leads to the mental disposition with which the act of 
delivery is executed (the mutual intention of transferring and receiving real rights) to 
be construed as a separate real agreement. Although the Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek 
does not require a real agreement for the transfer of real rights in the Netherlands, 
there is no doubt that a real agreement is indeed a requirement and that it fulfils an 
important function.64 However, there are also academics and practitioners in the 
Netherlands that subject the real agreement to criticism, as it is redundant in their 
opinion.65 As the real agreement is one of the outstanding characteristics of an 
abstract system, the Dutch system is abstract in this respect (contential 
abstraction).66 It differs from a pure causal system (such as that in France), where 
the intention of transferring and receiving real rights does not exist independently of 
the obligatory agreement, but forms an inherent part of that agreement. 
 
The statement is often come across that a causal system is applied in the 
Netherlands. It should, however, now be clear that such a statement is incorrect. 
This statement is founded on the fact that a valid obligatory agreement is a 
requirement for the transfer of real rights in the Netherlands, which is a characteristic 
                                            
63 In France delivery is not a juridical act with its own legal consequences; it is merely a factual act. 
A pure causal system (as in France) therefore is contradictory to Roman-Dutch law. See also 
Carey Miller Acquisition 124-125; Marsh Comparative Contract Law 238-244. 
64 Cronjé 1984 THRHR 200 loses sight of this. He sees nothing but the fact that a causal system is 
usually associated with the rule that real rights are not transferred if the obligatory agreement is 
null and void. 
65 A real agreement according to them is a requirement for the transfer of real rights only in an 
abstract system. See eg Den Dulk Zakelijke Overeenkomst 18-19; Van Oven 1935 WPNR 70. 
Furthermore Cronjé 1984 THRHR 202-205. 
66 As has already been remarked, the construction of the real agreement goes hand in hand with an 
abstract system (it is the creation of an abstract system). 
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of a causal system. It is, however, not realised that the Netherlands also displays the 
following characteristics of an abstract system, namely (1) real rights are not 
transferred by means of the obligatory agreement; an act of delivery must also take 
place; and (2) a real agreement (which forms part of the act of delivery) is a 
requirement for the transfer of real rights. 
 
6.2 Characteristics of a causal system 
 
The Dutch legal system does indeed also display the characteristics of a causal 
system, as applied in France, since a valid obligatory agreement is a requirement for 
the transfer of real rights. If an obligatory agreement is null and void, this prevents 
the transfer of real rights. In this respect it differs therefore from the South African 
and the German systems. Although a real agreement is a separate requirement for 
the transfer of real rights in the Netherlands, the practical value of the real 
agreement is limited by the requirement that the obligatory agreement has to be 
valid.67 Should the obligatory agreement be null and void, real rights will not be 
transferred even if the parties had the intention of transferring and even if there is a 
valid real agreement. The question as to whether or not a valid real agreement exists 
is therefore relevant only if the obligatory agreement is valid. The circumstances 
could for instance have changed since the conclusion of the contract to such an 
extent that one or both parties at the time of delivery (for instance due to defects with 
consensus) no longer have the intention to transfer the specific real right. Other 
factors may also prevent the transfer of real rights, for instance the fact that the 
transferor is no longer entitled to dispose of the thing. Real rights will in these 
circumstances not be transferred, not because the obligatory agreement is null and 
void, but because no valid real agreement exists. The real agreement is necessitated 
precisely by the fact that delivery in the Netherlands (unlike in France) is a separate 
requirement for the transfer of real rights, and that it entails more than simply a 
factual act. 
 
Should the obligatory agreement be valid, there are no essential differences between 
the abstract system as it is applied in South Africa and the system as it is applied in 
                                            
67  Pitlo, Reehuis and Heisterkamp Goederenrecht 114; Drobnig "Transfer of Property" 1015-10164. 
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the Netherlands. The question as to whether or not real rights are transferred 
depends in both systems only on whether or not a valid real agreement exists. If not, 
in both systems real rights will not be transferred. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
a) In a causal system real rights are transferred by conclusion of the obligatory 
agreement which should be valid and enforceable. The mutual intention to 
transfer and receive real rights is not construed as an independent real 
agreement. It is contained in the obligatory agreement. A real agreement has 
no right of existence in a causal system. The transferor finds himself in a 
favourable position in relation to other parties while bona fide third parties 
undoubtedly get the worst of the deal since they have no protection against* 
the disadvantageous consequences of delivery owing to a void obligation. 
 
b) In an abstract system the obligatory agreement is not sufficient for the transfer 
of real rights. The thing should also be delivered and there should be a valid 
real agreement which consists merely of the mutual intention to transfer and 
to receive real rights. The real agreement is a characteristic of an abstract 
system which distinguishes it from a causal system. Compared with those 
subject to the causal system, the transferee and third parties find themselves 
in a favourable position vis-à-vis the transferor. The abstract system also 
contributes towards easier determination of the point of time when an 
exchange of title takes place.68 
 
c) In a causal system the concept iusta causa refers to a valid and enforceable 
obligatory agreement or other juridical fact which obliges the transferee to 
deliver the thing. In an abstract system it serves no purpose to describe the 
causa with reference to the obligatory agreement, since it is not a substantive 
law requirement for the transfer of real rights. The causa concept refers rather 
to the mutual intention to transfer and to receive real rights, which is nothing 
less than the real agreement. Since the causa is contained in the real 
                                            
68 See Van der Merwe Sakereg 17. 
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agreement it has no further use in an abstract system and should be 
abandoned. 
 
d) The Dutch system displays the characteristics of an abstract system in that a 
separate act of delivery should exist and a valid real agreement is a 
requirement for the transfer of real rights. On the other hand, it displays the 
characteristics of a causal system since a valid obligatory agreement is a 
requirement for the transfer of real rights. 
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